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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOISE-PAYETTE LUMBER 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
PHOENIX INDEMNITY COM-
pANY, a corporation, BYRON J. 
DARLEY and BONNIE H. DAR-
LEY, 




Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the month of August, 1951, Byron J. Darley, the 
owner of Lot 217, l\iorningside Heights, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, entered into a contract with one Stanley 
H. Pickles for the erection of a residence on said real 
estate. The contract called for Mr. Pickles to build a 
house in accordance with eertain plans and specifica-
tions and required Mr. Darley to pay the contractor, 
~Jr. Pickles, the sum of $13,700.00 (R. 11, 12). 
The contract agreement specifies that the contractor 
shall ''save the Owner harmless from any liens or claims 
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arising out of the work herein agreed to be performed.'' 
(R. 15, Line 11). On the 20th day of September, 1951, 
Phoenix Indemnity Company entered into an agreement 
wherein they, as surety for Stanley H. Pickles, the con-
tractor, agreed to ''indemnify the Owner against any 
and all loss or damage directly arising by reason of the 
failure of the principal to faithfully perform said con-
tract.'' (R. 10, Line 21). 
Boise-Payette Lumber Company furnished lumber 
and building materials for use in and about the construc-
tion of the improvement on the premises of Byron J. 
Darley, of a total value of $968.61 for which they were 
not paid (R. 2, Line 8). 
Under the provisions of Section 14-2-2 U.C.A. (1953), 
the materialman, Boise-Payette Lumber Company, insti-
tuted an action against Byron J. and Bonnie H. Darley 
demanding the amount due to the materialman for ma-
terials furnished for the improvement of their premises. 
After the answer to the complaint had been filed 
by the owners, Byron J. and Bonnie H. Darley, their 
counsel entered a motion for judgment-no cause of 
action (R. 20), and after argument duly had, the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted the 
owners' motion for judgment-no cause of action, on the 
basis that they had complied with the provisions of Sec-
tion 14-2-1, U.C.A. (1953). 
(For emphasis, the Appellant has italicized portions 
of documents and authorities quoted in its brief.) 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The court erred in granting the defendants' and 
respondents' motion for summary judgment-no cause 
of action, in that: 
I. THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CONSID-
ERED ALONE, DOES NOT C011:PLY WITH THE 
REQUIRE:I\IENTS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 2, SEC-
TION 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (1953). 
II. THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CON-
STRUED TOGETHER AND IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OWNERS AND 
THE CONTRACTOR, DOES NOT COl\iPLY WITH 
OR MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 14, 




THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CONSIDERED 
ALONE, DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE RE-
QUIREI\TENTS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 2, SEC-
TION 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (1953). 
The statutes of the State of Utah under which this 
suit is instituted are Sections 14-2-1, 2, U.C.A. (1953) 
which provide as follows : 
'' 14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and ma-
terialmen.-The owner of any interest in land 
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entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, 
for t~e construction, addition to, or alteration or 
repau of, any building, structure or improvement 
upon land shall, before any such work is com-
menced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a 
sum equal to the contract price, with good and 
sufficient securities, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and prompt payment 
for material furnished and labor performed under 
the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner 
and to all other persons as their interest may 
appear; and any person who has furnished mate-
rials or performed labor for or upon such build-
ing, structure or improvement, payment for which 
has not been made, shall have a direct right of 
action against the sureties upon such bond for the 
reasonable value of the materials furnished or 
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any 
case the prices agreed upon; which right of action 
shall accrue forty days after the completion, or 
abandonment, or default in the performance, of 
the work provided for in the contract. 
''The bond herein provided for shall be ex-
hibited to any person interested, upon request." 
The bond in this cause is conditioned as follows: 
''NOW, THEREFORE, THE CONDITION 
OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH, That if the 
Principal shall indemnify the Owners against any 
and all loss or damage directly arising by reason 
of the failure of the Principal to faithfully per-
form said contract, then this obligation shall be 
void ; otherwise to remain in full force and effect.'' 
(R. 10, Lines 20 to 24 inclusive.) 
and runs to the benefit of the owners as follows : 
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'' ... Phoenix Indemnity Company ... as 
surety are held and firmly bound unto Byron. J. 
Darley and Bonnie H. Darley of. Salt ~ake C1ty, 
Utah . . . " ( R. 10, Lines 5 to 9 1ncl us1 ve.) 
The bond furnished does not run ''. . . to all other 
persons as their interest may appear; and any person 
who is furnished materials or performed labor for or 
upon such building ... '' nor is it '' ... conditioned for 
... prompt payment for materials furnished ... " as 
required by the statute from which the above quoted 
portions are extracted. Consequently, in order for the 
bond to qualify under the statute, some document other 
than the bond must be considered and construed with 
the bond in order for it to attain the standards set forth 
in the statute above cited, which relieve the owners from 
direct liability for payment of amounts due laborers and 
materialmen for work and materials furnished to the 
improvement of the premises of the owners. 
In the event a proper bond is not obtained, the 
owners are directly liable to the laborers and material-
men under the provisions of Section 14-2-2, U.C.A. (1953) 
as follows: 
H Failure to require bond-Direct liability.-
Any person subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter, who shall fail to obtain such good and suffi-
cient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein re-
quired, shall be personally liable to all persons 
who have furnished materials or performed labor 
under the contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor performed, not 
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POINT II. 
THE BOND FURNISHED, WHEN CONSTRUED 
TOGETHER AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OWNERS AND THE 
CONTRACTOR, DOES NOT COMPLY WITH OR 
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE 14, CHAP-
TER 2, SECTION 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
(1953). 
As indicated above, the bond purchased by the 
owners does not by itself meet the conditions and re-
quirements of the Utah Code with sufficient particularity 
to relieve the owners from direct liability for labor and 
materials furnished in the construction of an improve-
ment on the property of the owners. The bond and the 
contract involved in this action, when considered as a 
whole and construed together, constitute only an agree-
ment to save harmless or indemnify. The courts of this 
jurisdiction and other jurisdictions have consistently 
held that unless the documents contain an absolute 
promise to pay laborers and materialmen, the owners 
are not relieved from direct liability to them. 77 A.L.R. 
64; 118 A.L.R. 66; De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, et al., 
116 Utah 144, 208 P. 2d 1127. 
In the great majority of cases involving statutes 
requiring bonds for private contractors, the courts, in 
a just application of the principles of equity, have uni-
formly held that where the requirements of the statute 
are fairly and substantially met by the contract and the 
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bond guaranteeing performance of the contract, the 
owner would be relieved of the statutory liability for 
direct payment of labor and material. This line of 
authority seems proper, for though the documents may 
not technically comply with the statutes, substantial 
compliance is obtained and the comparative rights of the 
parties involved are maintained. 
However, the case at bar does not fall within the 
rule above cited, for in the cause at issue neither the 
bond nor the contract run to the benefit of, or require 
payment of laborers and materialmen. The instruments 
purport only to indemnify the owners against the claims 
of laborers and materialmen, and as a result, the laborer 
or materialman has no right of action against the bond-
ing company, whose duty to pay does not arise until the 
owners have suffered damage. Further, the owners 
cannot demand that the contractor pay laborers, for no 
liability as between the owners and contractor arises 
under the terms of the contract until such time as the 
owners have been damaged, at which time the contractor 
must save the owners harmless or indemnify the loss. 
Without question, it was the intention of the Legislature 
to afford laborers and materialmen a direct right of 
action against a substantial solvent surety, or afford 
them a right to institute a suit directly against the 
owners of the property. 
An owner upon instituting a plan for the construc-
tion of an improvement of his premises is faced with 
two alternatives as follows: 
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\ 
1. He may require the contractor to purchase and 
furnish a bond, running to the benefit of laborers and 
materialmen, wherein the sureties agree that they will 
pay to laborers and materialmen the reasonable value 
of the labor and material furnished; or, 
2. He may waive the requirement of the bond in 
which event he, as owner, is personally liable for the 
reasonable value of the labor and material furnished in 
the construction of the improvement. 
In the case at bar, the owners required that the con-
tractor enter into an agreement with the owners wherein 
the contractor agreed: " ... to save the Owner harmless 
from any lien or claim arising out of work herein agreed 
to be performed." (R. 15, Lines 11-13, inclusive), and, 
thereafter the contractor at his own instance, or at the 
request of the owners, furnished the owners with a bond 
in the penal amount of the contract, wherein the bond-
ing company and the contractor jointly agreed to 
''. . . indemnify the owner against any and all loss or 
damage ... " (R. 10, Line 21). By choice, the owners 
clearly assumed direct liability for payment of laborers 
and materialmen. 
The construction of bonds and contracts of the types 
herein considered, as far as counsel has been able to 
determine, has been almost completely uniform. The 
courts in all jurisdictions, in essence, holding that if the 
bond or contract require payment of laborers and 
materialmen, the spirit of the statute had been complied 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with and the owners were relieved of liability; but where 
the contract and bond agree only to save the owner 
harmless and indemnify him from loss, the requirements 
of the statutes have not been fairly and adequately met, 
and the owners are personally liable under the statutes 
to the laborers and materialmen. As direct authority 
for the principles above set forth, see 9 American Juris-
prudence-Building and Construction Contracts, which 
states, beginning on page 61: 
'' §95. Right of Persons Furnishing M a.terial 
or Labor to sue on Contractor's Bond to Owner. 
"§97. -As Dependent Upon Terms or Condi-
tion of Bond.- ... The weight of authority, and 
certainly the view more in keeping with the spirit 
of modern jurisprudence, sustains the right of a 
person furnishing labor or materials to recover 
on a private building contractor's bond naming 
the owner of the property as obligee, conditioned 
that the contractor shall pay all claims for labor 
and materials or that he shall pay laborers and 
materialmen12 as well as on a bond conditioned 
merely upon the faithful performance of the con-
tract, and containing no express and direct pro-
vision for their payment where the contract ex-
pressly required the contractor to pay such per-
sons or to satisfy all claims for labor and ma-
terials. 13 • • • ' ' 
" ... On the other hand, it has been held that 
laborers or materialmen have no right to recover 
on a bond conditioned merely for the application 
of the money received under the contract in pay-
ment for materials and labor,18 to furnish labor 
and materials/9 for the faithful performance of 
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the contract, 20 against liens, 1 unless the bond is 
also conditioned for the pa.yment of laborers and 
materialmen2 ••• '' 
'' §98. -Bond Conditioned to Indemnify Own-
er.-N o right of action exists in favor of a mate-
rialman or laborer against the surety on a private 
contractor's bond conditioned merely to indemnify 
and save harmless the owner from any pecuniary 
loss resulting from the breach of any of the terms 
of the contract between the contractor and the 
owner, since such bond is not intended for the 
benefit or protection of the third parties, but 
merely to indemnify the owner.5 ••• " 
"§99. -Effect of Statutes.-... Furthermore, 
a contractor's bond which does not contain the 
condition specified by a statute authorizing such 
bond for the payment of laborers and material-
men but expressly provides that the surety shall 
not be liable to anyone other than the owner, is 
not a statutory one, but is intended for the sole 
protection of the owner, and hence a laborer or 
rna terialman · cannot recover thereon against the 
surety.12 '' 
In addition to the text statements above set forth, 
this matter has been twice annotated in the American 
Law Reports. Pertinent extracts from 77 A.L.R. 21 at 
page 32 are as follows: 
''II. Introduction and general principles-
"b. Intention, :Motive, or purpose of parties 
direct or incidental benefit. 
'' ... And it has been stated that, where the 
bond is designed solely for the benefit. of the 
10 
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formal parties thereto, laborers and materialmen 
cannot sue thereon, even though they might derive 
some incidental, consequential, or remote benefit 
from its enforcement ... Montgomery v. Rief 
( 1897), 15 Utah 495, 50 Pac. 623 ; ... '' 77 A.L.R. 
21, 32. 
"III. Bond of Private Contractor-
''b. Terms of bond., 1. In general . . . As 
stated by the court in Knight & J. Co. v. Castle 
(1909), 172 Ind. 97, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 573, 87 N.E. 
976, the obligation of the surety to laborers and 
materialmen must arise from the written agree-
ment or not at all, and 'even in case of an inten-
tion that the promise shall be for the benefit of 
a third person, it must still be in writing'." 77 
A.L.R. 21, 55, 56. 
"5. Conditioned to Indemnify Owner, (a) In 
general. No right of action exists in favor of a 
materialman or laborer against the surety on a 
private contractor's bond conditioned merely to 
indemnify and save harmless the owner from any 
pecuniary loss resulting from the breach of any 
of the terms of the contract between the contrac-
tor and the owner, since such bond is not intended 
for the benefit or protection of the third parties, 
but merely to indemnify the owner. Pine Bluff 
Lodge of Elks v. Sanders (1908), 86 Ark. 291, 
111 s.w. 255. 
"And in Skinner Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Shevlin En-
gineering Co. (1931), 231 App. Div. 656, 248 N.Y. 
Supp. 380, it was held that a materialman could 
not recover against the surety on a contractor's 
bond to the owner, conditioned merely to hold the 
latter harmless in relation to any money that 
11 
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might be due the materialman from the contractor 
and from any expense incurred in litigation in 
connection therewith. 
''And a bond conditioned for the benefit and 
indemnification of the owner and persons advanc-
ing money to pay for labor and materials, and 
authorizing such persons to sue thereon, was held 
not to inure to the benefit of one furnishing mate-
rials, rather than advancing money, to the con-
tractor. Maca.tee v. Hamilton (1896), 15 Tex. Civ. 
App. 108, 38 S.W. 530, ... 11, 77 A.L.R. 21, 65. 
The pertinent extracts from the supplemental anno-
tation in 118 A.L.R. 68 are as follows : 
''III. Bond of a Private Contractor. 
* * * 
"4. Conditioned to perform contract. (Sup-
plementing annotation in 77 A.L.R. 65.) 
"A laborer or materialman cannot recover on 
a contractor's bond conditioned merely for the 
faithful performance of the contract. Southwest-
ern Dredging Corp. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 
(1934), 168 Okla. 217, 32 P. (2d) 274. See also 
Fleck-Atlantic Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. (1937) 
326 Pa. 15, 191 A. 51. 
"A common-law bond executed by a construc-
tion contractor, conditioned merely for the faith-
ful performance of the work contracted to be per-
formed, does not inure to the benefit of laborers 
and materialmen so as to enable them to sue there-
on. Crane Co. v·. Barwick Trenching Corp. (1934), 
138 Cal. App. 319, 32 P. (2d) 387. 
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"No later decisions herein. For earlier cases, 
see annotation in 77 A.L.R. 65. '' 118 A.L.R. 57, 
p. 68. 
It is interesting to note that there is not one case 
cited in the annotations wherein a materialman or 
laborer obtained against a bonding company or surety 
unless words unqualifiedly requiring payment were in-
volved. 
The case law in the State of Utah as established by 
this court is fully in accord with the majority opinion in 
the United States as expressed in text statements and 
annotations above set forth. This court's unanimous 
decision in the recent case of De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 
et al., 116 Utah 144, 208 P. (2d) 1127 stated as follows: 
" ... Furthermore, the language of Mr. Justice 
Thurman in M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American 
Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998, 1000, in re-
ferring to these cases, is here applicable: 
'It is not necessary to review the former 
decisions of the court referred to by counsel. If 
they are not in harmony with the last expression 
of the court [Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, et al., 46 
Utah 233, 148 P. 427] they are by implication 
overruled.' 
''In the Blyth-Fargo Co. case, cited by appel-
lant, the materialman was denied recovery because 
the bond was construed as an undertaking to 
assure performance of certain provisions of the 
contract which did not include that covering pay-
ment of materialmen. The whole tenor of the opin-
ion in that case leads to the conclusion that had 
not the limiting clauses been incorporated in the 
13 
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bond a contrary result would- have been reach-
ed ... " 116 Utah 144, 152. 
Key words in the case of Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, 
et al., 46 Utah 233, 148 Pac. 427, where the action was 
determined in favor of the bonding company and against 
the materialman, are the words indemnify and save 
harmless. 
"Now the condition of this obligation is such 
that if the said Free & Taylor, a co-partnership, 
shall well and truly keep and perform the terms 
and conditions of the said contract as recited 
herein, on its part to be kept and performed arnd 
shall indemnify and save harmless the said Snake 
Creek Mining & Tunnel Company ... " 46 Utah 
233 at 237. 
'' ... it must appear from the terms of the 
contract, or, as in this case, from the bond, that 
its provisions were intended directly for the 
benefit of the person who is bringing the action, 
or that he belongs to a class which was intended 
to be directly benefited ... " 46 Utah 233 at 242, 
243. 
The court thereafter cites many cases where either 
the bond or the contract contained wording requiring 
payment of materialmen. And, thereafter, in summation 
of an extensive review of cases, states: 
"It will be observed that in each and every 
one of the cases reviewed there are apt and clear 
expressions from which it is apparent that the 
parties to the contracts and bonds intended them 
for the benefit of those who should either perform 
labor on or furnish materials for the building or 
14 
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structure which the contractor agreed to erect 
or construct ... '' 46 Utah 233, 244. 
" ... If therefore the contracts provided for 
the payment of labor and material in general 
terms, as is the fact in nearly ·an, if not all, of 
the cases referred to, then it could well be assumed 
that the parties to those contracts and bonds must 
have intended them to be construed so as to cover 
all of the provisions contained in the contracts 
although not incorporated into the bonds. In the 
case at bar, however, the only provision that was 
contained in the contract that the contractor shall 
pay 'materialmen, laborers and other employees' 
is scrupulous excluded from the bond . . . '' 46 
Utah 233, 245. 
It seems apt to note here that the case at bar is 
actually stronger than the Blyth-Fargo case, supra, inso-
far as the position of the bonding company is concerned, 
for in the present case neither the contract nor the bond 
contain provisions requiring payment of materialmen. 
At a later point in the Blyth-Fargo Co. case, the court 
states: 
"While there may be general expressions, 
which, if construed or considered alone, might be 
given a wider scope or effect, yet when considered 
in connection with the express restrictions and 
limitations there is nothing contained in the bond 
which would not be proper to insert therein if 
given merely to indemnify against loss or damage 
which might be sustained by a particular corpora-
tion. This being so, we have no right to extend 
the scope and effect of the bond beyond what the 
parties hereto, from the language used by them, 
must have intended it should have ... " 46 Utah 
233 at 245, 246. 
15 
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